Is it True that ‘Evolution is a Theory, Not a Fact’?
1. Introduction. In recent years the teaching of evolutionary theory in U.S. public school science
classes has been called into question by school boards in various parts of the country. Salient
results have included public bickering, high-profile court cases, and school board mandated
evolution disclaimers, including some pasted on science textbooks.1 A 2005 court case that
garnered a lot of attention occurred in Cobb County, Georgia, where the dispute concerned the
legal status of a disclaimer placed, by the local school board, on high school biology textbooks.
The disclaimer reads as follows:
This textbook contains material on evolution. Evolution is a theory, not a fact, regarding
the origin of living things. This material should be approached with an open mind,
studied carefully, and critically considered.2
The Cobb County disclaimer is typical of a number of “evolution is a theory, not a fact” type
disclaimers, which have appeared in various forms in several states. For instance, in November
2004 the Dover Area School District in Pennsylvania issued a press release indicating that
science teachers would be required at the beginning of the evolution unit to say to students the
following:
Because Darwin’s Theory is a theory, it is still being tested as new evidence is
discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist for which there is no
evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation that unifies a broad range of
observations. Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs from
Darwin’s view. The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is available for students to
see if they would like to explore this view in an effort to gain an understanding of

what Intelligent Design actually involves. As is true with any theory, students are
encouraged to keep an open mind.3
Such disclaimers hearken back at least to 1995, when an evolution disclaimer was pasted on
Alabama’s state-approved biology texts. That disclaimer said:
This textbook discusses evolution, a controversial theory some scientists present as a
scientific explanation for the origin of living things, such as plants, animals and
humans. No one was present when life first appeared on earth. Therefore, any
statement about life’s origins should be considered as theory, not fact.4
In 1999, the Alabama disclaimer was also voted unanimously by the Oklahoma Textbook
Committee to be pasted on all Oklahoma public high school biology textbooks; and, from the
mid-1990s to 2005, the Beebe School District in Beebe, Arkansas had pasted on all high
school biology textbooks disclaimers that called evolution “a controversial theory” that many
people believe is not adequate to explain origins of life.5
As far as I know, there are no official “evolution is a theory, not a fact” disclaimers currently
being used on biology textbooks. This is mostly due to two recent high profile court cases
(Selman et al. v Cobb County School District and Kitzmiller et al. v Dover Area School District)
in which the disclaimers were ruled illegal due to their violating the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.6 It is somewhat ironic that some of this legal and legislative
maneuvering was prompted, at least indirectly, by President George W. Bush’s No Child Left
Behind Act, which mandates that states test students according to various state-adopted
standards. Since many states have adopted the 1996 National Science Education Standards—
which include the teaching of evolutionary theory—many school districts will teach evolution
(some for the first time) in order to meet curriculum standards by the end of 2007.7 Facing the

prospect that evolution will soon be taught in many more public school biology classes than ever
before, many opponents of evolutionary theory have sought, and continue to seek, to effect
public school policies that discredit the theory in two major ways: (1) by claiming that evolution
is a theory but not a fact, and (2) by claiming that evolutionary theory is controversial in science.
Although many people have commented on the legal justification for such policies, my
interest here solely concerns whether there is any justification, of the sort that pertains to
science, for such policies. Although I cannot respond effectively to every school science policy
under consideration, I will respond to both claims I mentioned above by focusing on the Cobb
County disclaimer, which succinctly expresses a view I wish to criticize.
My initial reaction to the “evolution is a theory, not a fact” disclaimer was puzzlement
about what it says. In this paper I do conceptual analysis on the disclaimer’s key claim in order
to discover whether there is any interpretation of it that can reasonably be considered to be
scientific advice helpful enough to high school biology students to warrant putting a disclaimer
on their biology textbooks.8 I will argue that the answer is “no”. I will steer clear, for the most
part, from considering substantive background assumptions of school board members and
political pressures from their constituents. The only crucial global assumptions that I will make
are that the disclaimer’s key claim, “Evolution is a theory, not a fact”, (1) is either true or false,
and (2) is to be taken to be the supporting evidence for the advice to students to consider
evolution carefully and critically before accepting it as correct.9
I take it that there are at least three conditions satisfactions of which are required for a
successful interpretation of the key claim. They are what I will refer to as the no-triviality
condition (i.e., the key claim is not trivially true), the no-clear-falsehood condition (i.e., the key
claim is not clearly false, given basic knowledge about the nature of science), and the

reasonable-support condition (i.e., the key claim provides a non-legal rationale, of the sort that
pertains to science, that justifies the advice it advocates).10 Before considering interpretations of
the key claim, it may be helpful for me to say a word about the relations among these three
conditions.
I assume that any interpretation of the key claim that violates either the no-triviality
condition or the no-clear-falsehood condition thereby violates the reasonable-support condition.
Hence, I see satisfactions of the no-triviality condition and the no-clear-falsehood condition to
be necessary for satisfying the reasonable-support condition. However, satisfying the former
conditions is not sufficient for satisfying the latter. An interpretation could satisfy the former but
remain not even marginally reasonable as a rationale for placing a disclaimer on a textbook that
puts students on their guard about a particular viewpoint at the heart of an entire scientific field
of study. The general point I am making here may be appreciated by considering this example:
The proposition human beings exist on planets other than Earth is neither trivially true nor
clearly false, but it would surely not be reasonable, given the evidence we actually do have, to
place a disclaimer on a public school textbook that is based on that proposition.
Searching for successful interpretations of the key claim will straightforwardly require
considering the use of the words “evolution”, “theory”, and “fact”.
2. Interpreting “evolution”. Since the disclaimer appears on a biology textbook, surely the term
“evolution” is intended to refer to the central concept of evolutionary biology. A good place to
start is the definition of “evolution” given in the biology textbook that was the target of the Cobb
County court case. According to the textbook, “evolution” is “the process by which modern
organisms have descended from ancient organisms”.11 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, in
the culture at large, there are a number of different ways that “evolution” is defined or

described. Alvin Plantinga has identified five theses that express views people sometimes
associate with evolution:12
Ancient Earth Thesis: The earth is very old (around 4.5 billion years old).
Progress Thesis: Life has progressed from relatively simple to relatively complex
forms of life (from unicellular life forms to human beings).
Common Ancestry Thesis: Life originated at only one place on earth, and all
subsequent living things are related by descent to those original living things.
Darwinism: Life developed on earth by means of natural mechanisms (commonly
expressed by “natural selection operating on random genetic mutation”).13
Naturalistic Origins Thesis: Life itself originated from non-living matter.
Although many scientists believe all these theses, and although each of them has sometimes
been associated with evolution, as Plantinga points out, only the Common Ancestry Thesis and
Darwinism are essential to the theory of evolution. Hence, when used in the key claim, some
descriptions of “evolution” are bound to fail the reasonable-support condition, because they
misrepresent the central concept of evolutionary biology. For instance, it is common for recent
evolution disclaimers to say—as all the disclaimers displayed above do say or imply—that
evolution is a theory about the origin of living things. Taken at face value, such a disclaimer
says that evolution is a theory about how life originated; that is, evolution is a theory about how
life, any life, began. Let us take this as some evidence for thinking that “evolution” in the
disclaimer means the conjunction of the Common Ancestry Thesis, Darwinism, and the
Naturalistic Origins Thesis.
Now, although it is true that many scientists are themselves thoroughgoing naturalists—
and thus believe the Naturalistic Origins Thesis—it is just not true that what is called

“evolution”, as used in biology, purports to tell us how life originated; rather, it purports to
explain how life developed. Indeed, the very textbook on which the disclaimer was placed in
Cobb County says, “the leap from nonlife to life is the greatest gap in scientific theories of
Earth’s early history”.14 It is remarkable that the biology textbook in question does not say that
evolution explains how life originated. Hence, if we take the disclaimer’s use of “evolution” to
include “a theory about how life originated”, then the result will be a disclaimer that is so
misleading that it is surely not going to pass even a weak criterion of reasonable support (since it
implies that one of the textbook’s claims says something that it does not actually say).15
Whether or not those who have supported using the key claim in a disclaimer on biology
textbooks have been confused about “evolution” as it is used in biology, it is worth thinking
about whether a more accurate description of “evolution” may serve to provide a key claim that
meets our three criteria. Toward this end, let us take “evolution” to mean the conjunction of
Darwinism and the Common Ancestry Thesis. A handy way to express the conjunction of
these two theses is to use Charles Darwin’s phrase, “descent with modification”. Accordingly,
evolution implies that human beings share their ancestry with other animals. This understanding
of “evolution” has three salient merits: it accurately and helpfully identifies what is commonly
thought to be the central concept of evolutionary biology, it is consistent with the biology
textbook’s summary of Darwin’s theory, and it is charitable to the disclaimer supporters in that
it has a consequence that many of the proponents of the key claim either deny or doubt: namely,
that human beings have descended with modifications from non-human species that lived in the
past.16 So, let us now consider the question: Is it true that descent with modification is a theory,
not a fact? The answer, of course, depends on what a theory and a fact amount to.

3. Interpreting “theory”. The word “theory” is used in various ways. I assume that we are
looking for a scientific use. Scientists use “theory” in several ways, and things referred to as
theories in science take a number of forms. The literature in the philosophy of science is rife
with discussions of the variations. We might consider all of them, but I see no need to do so,
because there is no reason at all to think that the drafters of the disclaimer intended their
warning to students to depend on some narrowly prescribed, highly technical, or highly
specialized notion of theory. Surely they intended “theory” to be understood, along the lines of
‘that which is, or may be used to provide, a general causal explanation of some widespread
domain of physical phenomena’. Indeed, the biology textbook in question defines theory as “a
well-supported testable explanation of phenomena that have occurred in the natural world”.17
Although scientists often use the word “theory” off the record with respect to any old
explanation (or, to indicate something more general that may be used to provide some
explanation), when scientists are careful, such as when they publish articles in peer-reviewed
journals, they usually differentiate what they call theories from what they call hypotheses. As
we were taught in grade-school, a hypothesis is something like a scientist’s educated guess or
hunch comprising an explanation of some phenomenon or phenomena, an explanation that has
yet to be subjected to the various scientific methods involved in empirical observation, testing,
measurement, prediction, and the like. Accordingly, a “theory”, when it is distinguished from a
hypothesis, amounts to an explanation of phenomena that has been confirmed by some scientific
method(s).
Of course, matters are not so clear-cut in the actual practice of science. For instance,
many things that are called “theories”, such as string theory, have not been confirmed by the
sorts of observations and tests that are characteristic of science, but they appear plausible to

many scientists. And, what is sometimes called a “hypothesis” in science is much more like a
prediction concerning some single phenomenon that a scientist hopes will be confirmed by
some particular test or observation.18 We can make use of some of these uses to draft
interpretations of “theory” that are very likely to be in the neighborhood of what the
disclaimer writers had in mind.
T is a theory1 =df. “T is a general scientific explanation (or T may be used to yield a
general scientific explanation) of a widespread domain of physical phenomena that
has been confirmed by some widely approved scientific method(s) to be wellsupported by the available empirical evidence”.
T is a theory2 =df. “T is a general scientific explanation (or T may be used to yield a
general scientific explanation) of a widespread domain of physical phenomena that has
not been confirmed by some widely approved scientific method(s) to be well-supported
by the available empirical evidence, but which some experts in the relevant scientific
field believe will be confirmed by some widely approved scientific method(s) to be
well-supported by the available empirical evidence”.
T is a theory3 =df. “T is merely a scientist’s hunch or educated guess that some
explanation of physical phenomena will be well-supported by some widely approved
scientific method(s).
Here it may be worthwhile to point out the kind of thing that has been said by everyone I
have talked to about the meaning of the disclaimer. According to this popular view, as well as
by some of the experts involved in the Cobb County trial, the disclaimer was intended to say
something along this line: ‘Evolution is an explanation of phenomena that amounts to little
more than a hunch or educated guess of scientists, and, therefore, we should not regard

evolution as well-supported by the actual scientific evidence.’19 If this is correct, then the first
part of the key claim says this: “Descent with modification is a theory3”. The problem with this
interpretation is that what it says is clearly false. Indeed, scientific experts have employed
numerous scientific tests, measurements, and predictive tools that confirm the explanation
involved in the theory of evolution. Even Alvin Plantinga, who is quite skeptical of
evolutionary theory, claims that descent with modification is the most probable of all the
properly scientific hypotheses, given the evidence and methodological naturalism, which
characterizes contemporary science.20 Thus, it is not true that evolution is a mere educated
guess or hunch based on general background information (scientific or otherwise). This is so
even if scientists have made some serious mistakes and even if they are wrong about evolution.
The key claim is also clearly false if it uses theory2, since evolution has been confirmed by
some widely approved scientific methods. Although there are apparently many non-scientists
who deny this, it is nevertheless clearly true that there are widely approved scientific methods
the use of which provides considerable confirmation for descent with modification. To object to
this claim is to reveal ignorance about the nature of scientific confirmation. So, if we are to
have any chance of producing an interpretation of the key claim that satisfies our three criteria,
then, among the alternatives, we must go with theory1 as the relevant interpretation of “theory”.
4. Interpreting “fact”. The word “fact” is used in various ways. By philosophers, “fact” is
often used to mean a true proposition or a state of affairs that obtains, or the like. Used in
this way, “fact” is intended to assert that some feature of the world is a particular way. This
meaning of “fact” does not imply anything about epistemic factors; for instance, it does not
imply that there is public evidence, logical support, observational confirmation, proof, or
anything of the sort, in relation to the claim asserted. Some examples of this use of “fact”

include these: “There is a fact about whether God exists”, “There are moral facts”, and
“Regardless of which side of the debate one favors, there is a fact about the matter”, etc.21
Although there is no single way that “fact” gets used by scientists, a common use of “fact”
by scientists means “an experimental observation”. Examples might include “It is a fact that the
blue litmus paper turned red when I applied vinegar to it”, and “It is a fact that the most
powerful existing telescope revealed no satellite of the moon”. Accordingly, a fact is something
along the lines of a single observation.22
These uses of “fact” are exemplary in that they imply that the person who asserts that
something X is a fact believes that X is true. I think that this point generalizes: anytime one
asserts that “X is a fact” one expresses one’s belief that the thing asserted is true. Note how odd
it would be to hear someone say, “It is a fact that water is H2O, but I do not believe that water is
H2O”, or “It is a fact that I locked the door, but I don’t know whether to believe it or not”. If
someone were to say such things, we would wonder whether that person has any idea what a
fact is.23
However, it does not follow that saying “X is not a fact” indicates that one believes that X
is false. Although believing that X is true is necessary for thinking that X is a fact, there are
uses of “fact” in which it is clear enough that believing that X is true is not sufficient for
thinking that X is a fact. We can see this clearly enough when we consider uses of “fact” that
imply some epistemological status.
At one end of the epistemic spectrum, I suppose one could mean by “fact” something like
“conceptual truth”: for example, “It is a fact (or, it is a conceptual fact) that 2 + 3 = 5.” One
might use “fact” in such a sentence to indicate that 2 + 3 = 5 is conceptually true such that
anyone who thinks rightly about the concepts involved in the claim can come to know with

epistemic certainty that it is true. It would be possible for someone to think that a claim is true
but not think that the claim is conceptually true; hence, such a person who uses “fact” to mean
“conceptual truth” could consistently believe that a claim is true but not a fact.24
More ordinary epistemological uses of “fact” concern empirical claims, such as “It is a fact
that the sun is larger than the earth”. I will mention various uses of “fact” that seem to pick out
the kinds of things that some actual person might mean by the term. These examples start with
a highly restrictive use and become less restrictive. For ease of presentation, I will use p to refer
to the assertion: The sun is larger than the earth. In addition to the uses I have previously
mentioned, someone might mean by “It is a fact that p” that p is true and the actual publicly
available evidence proves that p (i.e., proves in the sense that no new evidence could show
that p is false). Or, that all the publicly available evidence strongly supports p (i.e., that the
publicly available evidence makes the claim beyond a reasonable doubt), or that p is true and
that one’s internal evidence supports p. Or, one might mean that p is true and all astronomers
(or, scientists) believe on the basis of their expertise that p; or, that all educated people (or,
people in general) believe that p. Or one might mean that the vast majority of astronomers
(or, scientists, or educated people, or people generally) believe that p. Or, one might mean
that p is true and a majority of astronomers (or, scientists, or educated people, or people
generally) believe that p. Or, one might mean that p is true and a substantial minority of
astronomers (or, scientists, or educated people, or people generally), whose view about the
size of the earth and sun one agrees with, believes that p. Or, one might mean that p is true
and a few astronomers (or, scientists, or educated people, or people generally), whose view
about the size of the earth and sun one agrees with, believe that p. Or, one might mean that p
is true and some astronomer (or, scientist, or educated person, or person generally), whose

view about the size of the sun and earth one agrees with, believes that p. I doubt that there is
any epistemological use of “fact” in such a sentence that differs substantially from the ones I
have mentioned.25
I doubt that “fact” actually gets used in all the ways I have mentioned, and some of those
ways are so weak or so wacky that it would be very uncharitable to the disclaimer writers to
suggest that they had any of them in mind. For clarity’s sake in what follows, I will list a range
of interpretations of “fact” that I take to be in the relevant neighborhood.
fact1: X is true (or, X indicates a particular state of affairs that obtains in the world).
fact2: X is true, and X is conceptually true.
fact3: X is true, and some scientist has observed that X (i.e., it has seemed to some scientist
on the basis of some empirical observation that X is true)
fact4: X is true, and the publicly available evidence supporting X proves that X is true in the
sense that no new evidence could show that X is false.
fact5: X is true, and the publicly available evidence strongly supports X’s being true.
fact6: X is true, and my total internal evidence strongly supports X’s being true.
fact7: X is true, and all the experts in the relevant specific field of inquiry believe on the
basis of their expertise that X is true
fact8: X is true, and all educated people believe that X is true.
fact9: X is true and all people believe that X is true.
fact10: X is true, and the vast majority of experts in the relevant general field of study
believe on the basis of their expertise that X is true.
fact11: X is true, and the vast majority of educated people believe that X is true.
fact12: X is true, and the vast majority of people believe that X is true.

fact13: X is true, and the majority of experts in the relevant general field of study believe on
the basis of their expertise that X is true.
fact14: X is true, and the majority of educated people believe that X is true.
fact15: X is true, and it is common sense that X is true (i.e., the majority of people believe
that X is true).
fact16: X is true, and a substantial minority number of experts in the relevant general field of
inquiry whose view on the matter I agree with believe on the basis of their expertise that X
is true.
fact17: X is true, and a substantial minority number of educated people whose view on the
matter I agree with believe that X is true.
5. Evaluations of the Key Claim. Let us pause to consider what we have achieved thus far
forth. The key claim, which I will refer to as the penultimate claim, means this:
Penultimate Claim: Descent with modification (expressed by the conjunction of
Darwinism and the Common Ancestry Thesis) is a general scientific explanation (or may
be used to yield a general scientific explanation) of a widespread domain of physical
phenomena that has been confirmed by some widely approved scientific method(s) to be
well-supported by the available empirical evidence, and descent with modification is not
a fact.
We now need to consider the various uses of “fact” in order to figure out whether
there is any interpretation of the penultimate claim that satisfies our three conditions.
Filling in the penultimate claim with fact2, fact3, fact4, or fact7 runs afoul of the no-triviality
condition. Descent with modification is surely not a conceptual truth, but neither is any scientific
theory; so, the penultimate claim with fact2 fails the no-triviality test. Also, descent with

modification is not itself an empirical observation but is rather an explanation of empirical
observations; and, this is true of any scientific theory; so, fact3 is no good. Furthermore, descent
with modification would not be a scientific explanation at all if it were not open to revision based
on new evidence. But, it is surely a scientific explanation. So, the penultimate claim understood
along the lines of fact4 is trivially true in the sense that it is true of all scientific explanations. I
can think of no even marginally reasonable scientific rationale for instructing students to be
especially careful about accepting one particular scientific theory when that rationale applies
equally well to all scientific theories. Hence, a successful key claim is not to be understood along
the lines of fact2, fact3, or fact4.
An interpretation using fact7 has to do with experts (biologists or other scientists) who do
not believe that descent with modification is true. This interpretation is true, since there are
some biologists or other scientists who deny descent with modification. However, the number
is very small and the percentage of biologists and scientists who deny descent with
modification is extremely low. According to a 1996 survey, only 5% of American scientists
deny descent with modification as the correct explanation for the development of human
beings, whereas 95% agree that descent with modification is the correct explanation.26 That a
few American scientists deny descent with modification hardly warrants a disclaimer; for, if it
did, then almost every scientific theory would warrant a disclaimer, since almost every
scientific theory has a few detractors among scientists. But surely even the drafters of the Cobb
County disclaimer do not think that nearly all scientific theories warrant a disclaimer. It seems
clear that, even though this use of “fact” in the penultimate claim is not trivial in the sense that
it applies to all scientific theories, it is nevertheless trivial because it applies to almost all
scientific theories; but, no reasonable person, I take it, thinks that we are justified in putting

disclaimers on science textbooks for almost every scientific theory, just because he or she is
aware that some scientists dissent from the prevailing view.
Other interpretations clearly fail to satisfy the no-clear-falsehood condition. This is so of
those using fact10, fact13, or fact16. As I have mentioned, the vast majority of specialists in the
relevant general field of study (biology), as well as the vast majority of scientists generally
(95%), believes that descent with modification is a true explanation for the development of
human beings (a claim about which many disclaimer supporters are surely sensitive). Hence, the
penultimate claim used with fact10 is clearly false; and, if the vast majority of biologists and
scientists believe this, then so does the majority of biologists and scientists; hence, the
penultimate claim used with fact13 is clearly false. Furthermore, there is no substantial minority
percentage of biologists or scientists who believe that descent with modification is false; so, the
penultimate claim used with fact16 is clearly false. To be sure, there is a fairly high percentage of
scientists who believe that God exists and that God is the creator of life.27 But, those views are
consistent with descent with modification. Descent with modification, by itself, implies nothing
at all either about God’s existence or about the origin of life. Perhaps this point has not been
appreciated by many parties in the disclaimer disputes.
Other interpretations clearly run afoul of the reasonable-support condition. This is so of the
penultimate claim used with fact1, fact5, fact6, fact8, fact9, fact11, fact12, fact14, fact15, or fact17.
Fact1 used in the penultimate claim says that descent with modification is false. However, even
if the drafters of the disclaimer believe that descent with modification is false, surely they did
not intend for the disclaimer to tell schoolchildren that descent with modification is false. This
would be an uncharitable interpretation. To see why, consider that the key claim of the
disclaimer is followed by this: “This material should be approached with an open mind, studied

carefully, and critically considered”. Such an injunction indicates that something along the line
of suspending judgment on the issue is called for, rather than disbelief.28
Fact8, fact9, fact11, fact12, fact14, fact15, and fact17 also fail the reasonable-support criterion.
These uses of “fact” have in common the feature that some group, comprised mostly by nonscientists, believes that descent with modification is false. But, why would the views of people
with little or no training in science warrant placing a disclaimer about a scientific theory on a
science book? Generally, it is unreasonable to believe the claims of non-experts about a matter
when those claims are inconsistent with the claims of the vast majority of experts about that
matter. If I want to know something about what it takes to build a car, it would be reasonable for
me to rely on the advice of a professional car builder, but it would surely be unreasonable for me
to rely on the advice of a non-car builder when I am aware that the non-car builder’s advice is
inconsistent with the professional’s advice. But, since non-scientists do not do science, they are
in no position to have special scientific information about the development of species. They
may, and often do, claim to have special information about the matter, but it is not the result of
science. And, the issue here is the reasonability of putting a disclaimer on a biology textbook
that tells students to be especially on their guard about a particular scientific explanation, which
is doubted by some group of non-scientists. Even if it were true that a very great majority of
non-scientists believed that descent with modification is false, this would be irrelevant: although
I have not done a survey, I would bet that a very large percentage of non-scientists do not
believe that there is indeterminacy at the subatomic level. Suppose that we discovered that a
large percentage of them disbelieved that there is such indeterminacy: would we thereby be
justified in putting a disclaimer on physics textbooks?29

Fact5 and Fact6 are the most interesting. Used in the penultimate claim, fact5 says that it is
not the case that the publicly available evidence strongly supports descent with modification’s
being true. However, that almost all the biologists and scientists believe that the publicly
available evidence strongly supports descent with modification provides considerable reason to
think that the penultimate claim using fact5 is false.30 Of course, it is possible that the biologists
and scientists are wrong about the matter. But, the important issue here concerns which
scientific theory is probable given the publicly available empirical evidence. As I pointed out
earlier, there is no question that there are widely accepted scientific methods that confirm
descent modification. No honest person with a basic understanding of the nature of science
would dispute this.31
One might wonder whether there is some rival theory that is confirmed by widely accepted
scientific methods. No. There is no rival theory that enjoys even a smidgen of the confirmation
by widely approved scientific methods that descent with modification enjoys. Someone might
consider the notion of intelligent design in this context. Note, however, that extant intelligent
design views in science are so sketchy and incomplete that they are not so much as testable. To
be sure, there are many philosophical arguments for intelligent design, and there have been
some books and articles published by scientists that have argued for claims that are friendly to
an intelligent design position.32 But, no scientist has told us much of anything about the
intelligence, power, goals, or intentions of any intelligent designer necessary to evaluate an
intelligent design hypothesis in light of standard scientific criteria, such as empiricality,
observability, falsifiability, testability, controllability, predictability, fruitfulness, and the like.
Now, to be sure, there are plenty of people who are happy to place God in the role of intelligent
designer, but it is remarkable that there is no scientific theory currently being discussed in the

science journals that names God as the intelligent designer. My point is that intelligent design
explanations in science are so sketchy that we just do not have a scientific theory mentioning
an intelligent designer that is so much as testable by scientific methods.33 If we ever get one,
we can consider whether the publicly available evidence favors one view over the other, given
the employment of widely accepted scientific methods.34 But, the point to see here is one made
by Branden Fitelsen and Elliot Sober: whether or not we are justified in thinking that a
scientific theory is well supported by the publicly available evidence is, at least in part, a matter
of comparison: since there is very little scientific confirmation of any rival to descent with
modification, and since descent with modification has been confirmed by widely accepted
scientific methods, we have reason to believe that descent with modification is well supported
by the publicly available evidence.35 A recent statement by The Royal Society (the UK national
academy of science) acknowledged, in an April 2006 statement, that evolutionary theory is the
best explanation for the development of life on Earth:
One of the most important advances in our knowledge has been the development of
the theory of evolution by natural selection. Since being proposed by Charles Darwin
nearly 150 years ago, the theory of evolution has been supported by a mounting body
of scientific evidence. Today it is recognised as the best explanation for the
development of life on Earth from its beginnings and for the diversity of species.
Evolution is rightly taught as an essential part of biology and science courses in
schools, colleges and universities across the world.... The theory of evolution is
supported by the weight of scientific evidence ....36
Could it be that the framers of the disclaimer have publicly available evidence that
scientists do not have? Have the vast majority of biologists and scientists misidentified the data,

or misapplied the data, or failed to recognize what the evidence actually supports, or failed to
discern the best explanation of the evidence? If so, then there is a great deal of motivation for
some enterprising scientist to argue for such claims in the science journals. But, I take it, the
framers of the disclaimers are in no position to argue for such claims. Hence, the penultimate
claim used with fact5 seems to be false, and, in any case, it runs afoul of the reasonable-support
criterion.
Nevertheless, I think that there is an important issue to be discussed with respect to fact5.
That issue is methodological naturalism. According to methodological naturalism, no theory or
hypothesis utilizing anything supernatural can count as scientific. Apparently, this view is
thought by virtually all scientists (and some philosophers of science) to be essential to
science.37 However, it is no secret that a large percentage of Americans, as well as a large
percentage of the disclaimer supporters, take descent with modification to be inconsistent with
some of their religious beliefs, according to which God (a supernatural being) has played a
causal role in the origin and development of life. Some such beliefs (but surely not all of them)
are almost surely false if descent with modification is true.38 Nevertheless, if methodological
naturalism is essential to science, then descent with modification is without question the most
probable theory among any scientific alternatives. Moreover, if methodological naturalism is
true, then descent with modification is extremely probable on the evidence. Perhaps some rival
theory that also enjoys a great deal of scientific confirmation will arise in the future, but there is
no such rival at present.39 This explains why most scientists think that disclaimers, political
battles, and court cases over the teaching of evolution in public schools are either idiotic or the
result of ignorance about the nature of science; for, if methodological naturalism is true, then
the matter seems about as settled as scientific theories can be.40

Fact6 used in the penultimate claim also fails to satisfy the reasonable-support test, but for a
different reason. It says that it is not the case that my total internal evidence strongly supports
descent with modification’s being true. I think that we should grant that it is possible for
someone’s total internal evidence to support thinking that descent with modification is false. For
all I know, for instance, there is someone who has legitimate evidence (whether or not it would
be widely considered to be legitimate), perhaps some form of special religious evidence, which
supports thinking that descent with modification is false, even if that person knows that
scientists overwhelmingly endorse descent with modification. This would require, I think, some
very special evidential circumstance, but it seems to me possible. Suppose that some framer of
the disclaimer managed to get such evidence. Would it thereby be reasonable for that person to
put a disclaimer about evolution on the biology textbooks of every student in a public school
district? Surely not. It would be reasonable only if that person had good scientific reasons to
deny descent with modification. But, again, the framers of the disclaimer are not scientists, and
they possess no good scientific evidence that descent with modification is false. I conclude that
even if the penultimate claim used with fact6 is true, given some school board member’s
internal evidence, that claim does not make putting the disclaimers on the textbooks a
scientifically justified thing to do.
6. Conclusion. Having assessed all the interpretations of the key claim I consider to be in the

neighborhood of our target, I conclude that there is no meaning of the key claim that provides
even a marginally reasonable ground, of the sort that pertains to science, for a disclaimer of the
“evolution is a theory, not a fact” sort to be placed on school textbooks or used in school
policies. Is the key claim true? If I am correct, then this is what we should think: On some
interpretations, the key claim is true but trivial; hence, those interpretations do not make it

reasonable to place a disclaimer on a science textbook. On other interpretations, the key claim
is clearly false, given basic knowledge of science and very little thought; hence those
interpretations do not make it scientifically reasonable to place a disclaimer on a science
textbook. On all the other interpretations, the key claim is true but not even marginally
justifiable as a rationale, of the kind pertaining to science, for placing a disclaimer on biology
textbooks. Therefore, there is no interpretation of the key claim that scientifically justifies
putting the disclaimer on biology textbooks.
7. Final Thoughts. What can we learn from all this? Three things come to mind. First, it seems

to me that the reasoning involved in developing disclaimers of the “evolution is a theory, not a
fact” sort reveals serious misunderstandings or ignorance about science, even if that reasoning is
not quite in the neighborhood of what Plantinga has called “stupid reasons” for rejecting
evolution.41 Although those disclaimers do not explicitly reject evolution, they suggest that the
scientific status of evolution is considerably worse than it actually is.
Second, I think that the sorts of evolution disputes going on in the culture at large reveal that
there is a large percentage of people in general, and a considerable percentage of educated
people, including members of school boards, who do not understand the nature or methods of
science, or who do not understand the nature of various forms of argumentation. It is a travesty
that a course in reason and argument—which teaches basic skills in deductive, inductive, and
abductive reasoning—is not required of high school students. If we really care about this stuff,
we ought to try to do something about it.
Third, there are reasons to think that the status of methodological naturalism in science is
relevant to our assessment of the key claim using fact5. Although there is clearly no current
scientific rival to descent with modification worth taking seriously, the privileged status of

methodological naturalism in science explains, in part, why the key claim using fact5 fails the
reasonable-support condition; for, it effectively prevents the publishing, in mainstream science
journals, of peer-reviewed articles that would provide the sort of detail needed to yield a testable
rival to current evolutionary theory. However, since powerful arguments from the philosophy of
science cast doubt on methodological naturalism, we can expect proponents of the intelligent
design movement to use such philosophical arguments in an attempt to diminish evolutionary
theory’s status in science. Should the strategy succeed, a likely result, given much public
sentiment and the strong political will of the anti-evolution movement, would be an escalation of
public battles fought over evolution, as well as calls for significant revisions of what seem to be
perfectly good science textbooks by those who know little about science. The stakes are high.
This might explain why some philosophers of science have argued in high profile court cases
that science cannot appeal to the supernatural, even when those philosophers have reason to
believe that there is no principled reason that rules out supernatural explanations as being
unscientific.42 Despite my own skepticism about methodological naturalism, I too worry about
the likely consequences of a public relaxing of the de facto restrictions on what counts as
science. From my perspective, methodological naturalism is a vexed, troubling issue, but I
predict that it is going to be a hot topic of future public debates over evolution.43
Todd R. Long
California Polytechnic State University
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Sober, “Plantinga’s Probability Arguments against Evolutionary Naturalism” in Robert T.
Pennock (ed.), Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics (MIT Press) 2001, pp. 411-427.
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Michael Behe, Darwin’s Black Box (The Free Press) 1996 and William Dembski, The Design
Inference (Cambridge University Press) 1998. See also the list of pro-intelligent design
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http://www.discovery.org/csc/. Also, for useful collections of essays by philosophers and
scientists on either side of current debates about intelligent design, see William Dembski and
Michael Ruse (eds.) Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA (Cambridge University Press)
2004, and Robert T. Pennock (ed.), Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics (MIT Press)
2001.
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Matt Young, “Is Intelligent Design Science?” in Matt Young and Taner Edis (eds.), Why
Intelligent Design Fails (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press) 2005, pp. 185-196. See also
Matthew J. Brauer, Barbara Forrest, and Steven G. Gey, “Is it Science Yet?: Intelligent Design
Creationism and the Constitution”, Washington University Law Quarterly 83:1, 2005, 121-124.
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A fine argument for this point is made by Elliot Sober, Philosophy of Biology (Boulder:

Westview Press) 1993, pp. 42-54.
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For a helpful discussion and explanation of how evidential support in science depends generally

on comparisons of extant scientific theories, as well as an excellent treatment of the scientific
status of intelligent design theory in contrast to evolutionary theory, see Branden Fitelsen, “Some
Remarks on the “Intelligent Design Controversy”, unpublished manuscript, 2005
(http://fitelson.org/id.pdf). Elliot Sober also argues that testing a scientific theory is essentially a
contrastive activity, in which one specifies a range of alternative theories against which to test the
theory at issue. See Elliot Sober, “Testability”, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA, 73:2, pp.
47-76. See also Elliot Sober, “Contrastive Empiricism” in C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific
Theories, vol. 14 (University of Minesota Press) 1990, pp. 392-410. See also Elliot Sober,
Philosophy of Biology (Boulder: Westview Press) 1993, pp. 42-46.
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Royal Society statement on evolution, creationism, and intelligent design:

(http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/news.asp?id=4298).
37

Basil Whiley seems to speak for a lot of scientists (theists and atheists) in saying: “Science

must be provisionally atheistic or cease to be itself”. See Basil Whiley, “Darwin’s Place in the
History of Thought” in M. Banton (ed.), Darwinism and the Study of Society (Chicago:
Quandrangle Books) 1961. There is a huge body of commentary about the recent evolution
disclaimers and court cases that reveals that methodological naturalism continues to prevail as a
popular presupposition for science. Methodological naturalism was explicitly discussed in the
Kitzmiller v Dover Area School District trial by two philosophers of science, Robert Pennock
and Barbara Forrest. Pennock said, “[We scientists] are forced to restrain ourselves to looking for
natural regularities. That’s part of what it means to be able to give evidence for something.
You’ve undermined that notion of empirical evidence if you start to introduce the supernatural”,
and Forrest said, “Methodological naturalism is a methodology. It’s a way of addressing

scientific questions. It reflects the practice of science that has been successfully established over
a period of centuries. It’s not imposed upon science. It reflects the successful practice of
science”. A helpful selection of this discussion is provided by Ophelia Benson, “Intelligent
Design is Not Science: Official”, The Philosopher’s Magazine, 2006
(http://www.philosophersnet.com/magazine/article.php?id=1000).
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For instance, the proposition that the Earth is only a few thousand years old is almost surely

false, given descent with modification. Note, though, that it does not follow that God did not
create the universe or that God did not create life.
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A nontheistic rival to evolution is appealed to by The Raelian Movement

(http://www.rael.org), according to which life on earth was genetically engineered by purposeful,
intelligent design: by extraterrestrial humans. However, we have at present almost no evidence
for the theory except for the testimony of Rael. See Robert T. Pennock, “Why Creationism
Should Not Be Taught in the Public Schools” in Robert T. Pennock (ed.), Intelligent Design
Creationism and Its Critics (MIT Press) 2001, p. 761.
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That is, the matter of which scientific theory is better confirmed by the evidence. Is

methodological naturalism true? Although it certainly characterizes an attitude among today’s
mainstream scientists, some fine work by philosophers of science calls into question the status
of methodological naturalism. In addition to the much discussed “demarcation problem”, which
seems to reveal that there is no necessary and sufficient condition for something to be science,
the fact that scientists frequently use inference to the best explanation (and similar kinds of
reasoning) seems to allow for scientific hypotheses and theories that appeal to the supernatural.
For an argument that a theory that appeals to the supernatural can satisfy scientific standards,
see Del Ratzsch, Nature, Design and Science (SUNY Press) 2001. For examples of arguments

from philosophers of science (including some who are no friends of intelligent design theory or
any view according to which a supernatural being exists) that support the possibility of a
properly scientific theory, explanation, or hypothesis that appeals to the supernatural, or that
show that there is no necessary and sufficient condition for what counts as scientific that would
rule out appeals to the supernatural as being unscientific, see Larry Laudan, “The Demise of the
Demarcation Problem” in Michael Ruse (ed.), But Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in
the Creation/Evolution Controversy, (Buffalo: Prometheus) 1988, 337-350; also see Mark
Perakh and Mark Young, “Is Intelligent Design Science?” in Matt Young and Taner Edis (eds.),
Why Intelligent Design Fails (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press) 2005, pp. 185-196;
also see Elliot Sober, Philosophy of Biology (Westview Press) 1993, ch. 2.
If methodological naturalism were to become discredited among scientists, then this could, in
principle, open the door for a theory that would threaten the scientific status of evolutionary
theory. The existence of such a rival could then provide for a key claim using fact5 that would
pass all our tests of a successful interpretation. Will a serious rival emerge in the future? I doubt it,
in part because, as I mention in section 7, the near consensus among scientists that methodological
naturalism is true practically prevents the publishing, in mainstream science journals, of peerreviewed articles that would provide enough detail to yield a testable rival to current evolutionary
theory. Interestingly, even most philosophers of science who have testified as expert witnesses in
evolution-related trials in recent years have joined the chorus of scientists in singing the praises of
methodological naturalism as presupposed by science. This chorus has certainly convinced judges
that would-be intelligent design theories, for instance, are essentially religious, rather than
scientific. For instance, in the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District trial, philosophers of
science Robert Pennock and Barbara Forrest testified in support of methodological naturalism in

science. Forrest was asked by the defense attorney: “Should scientists be allowed to follow the
evidence where it leads or should they be constrained to follow the evidence only where
materialism allows?”, to which Forrest replied, “Science by its nature and on the basis of its
successful practice cannot address questions of the supernatural, and that’s because the
cognitive faculties that humans have will not take us beyond the reach of those faculties. And
so science is really an intellectually quite humble process. It does not address supernatural
claims. It has no methodology by which to do that”. Quotations provided by Ophelia Benson,
“Intelligent Design is Not Science: Official”, The Philosopher’s Magazine, 2006
(http://www.philosophersnet.com/magazine/article.php?id=1000).
Two thoughts come to mind: first, although I am not sure what was precisely meant by
“cognitive faculties that humans have will not take us beyond the reach of those faculties”, I am
sure that religious people (including many scientists) for thousands of years have been claiming
to have access to the supernatural; and, second, it seems to me that science does have
methodologies to address supernatural claims: those involved in inference to the best
explanation. What prevents us, at least in principle, from comparing, say, evolutionary theory, to
some other scientific theory that appeals to a supernatural being, in order to determine which is
the best explanation according to the prevailing scientific methods? It is not at all obvious that,
merely by mentioning a supernatural being, a theory cannot possess virtues sometimes cited as
characteristic of science: empiricality, observability, falsifiability, testability, controllability,
predictability, fruitfulness, and the like.
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Plantinga directed his own criticism to the early literature from so-called “Creation Science”.

See Alvin Plantinga, “When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible” in Robert T.
Pennock (ed.), Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics (MIT Press) 2001, pp. 113-145.

It is worth noting that my central claims in the paper do not imply that those who drafted the
disclaimers were themselves stupid, or believing irrationally or acting irrationally. As for belief, I
suspect that many disclaimer supporters were either misinformed or ignorant about crucial issues
concerning how biology or science in general works, as well as about which theses are crucial to
evolutionary theory; accordingly, they might have had reason to believe that evolution is
considerably worse as a scientific explanation than are many other scientific explanations. And,
given the political pressures placed on them by many of their constituents, it could be that the
school board members who were responsible for the actual disclaimers were not acting
irrationally, either. To find out whether their actions were rational, we would need to know what
obligations school board members have to seek out information from the scientific community,
what obligations school board members have to satisfy their constituents, and what obligations
they have to consider the legal consequences of their behavior. Such issues go beyond the scope
of this paper, and, in any case, I do not know how to settle those issues.
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A helpful discussion of this general issue occurs in Part Four in Michael Ruse (ed.), But Is It

Science? (Buffalo: Prometheus) 1988, pp. 335-399, in which philosophers of science Larry
Laudan, Michael Ruse, and Philip Quinn discuss Michael Ruse’s expert testimony at the 1981
Arkansas Creationism trial (McLean v. Arkansas). Laudan and Quinn argue separately that the
victory for science accomplished by the judge’s ruling was hollow or underhanded, for, as
Laudan says, “it was achieved only at the expense of perpetuating and canonizing a false
stereotype of what science is and how it works”. See Larry Laudan, “Science at the Bar—
Causes for Concern” in Michael Ruse (ed.), But Is It Science? (Buffalo: Prometheus) 1988, p.
355. Quinn bemoans the risks and dilemmas that philosophers of science often face when they
get involved in policy-making. The risks are that, if philosophers of science seek to express the

subtle distinctions and nuances they think are necessary to provide an accurate description of
science, they may well fail to communicate or be misunderstood. See Philip Quinn, “The
Philosopher of Science as Expert Witness” in Michael Ruse (ed.), But Is It Science? (Buffalo:
Prometheus) 1988, pp. 367-385. The dilemma is between corruption and ineffectuality. If expert
witnesses wish to be understood and efficacious, they may have to dirty their hands by making
claims about science that they know to be false; on the other hand, if they wish to avoid
corruption, they may have to say things that fail to get the public results that would be good for
science. See Philip Quinn, “Creationism, Methodology, and Politics” in Michael Ruse (ed.), But
Is It Science? (Buffalo: Prometheus) 1988, pp. 395-399.
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